Policy Rules for Dummies (cps)

Just as a vital sign: Ever wonder what the whole "rules vs. discretion" debate was about? Again, let Goldman Sachs be of service:

#1: Rules are for the obedience of fools, and the guidance of people like us.
— GS Elevator Gossip (@GSElevator) June 13, 2013

Papers We Read: United States Then, Europe Now (cps)

This week, we read

Sargent, Thomas J. (2012): "Nobel Lecture: United States Then, Europe Now", Journal of Political Economy, 120 (1), 1-40.

In short, it's a historical case study---set in the 18th- and 19th-century to-be-United States of America---wrapped around the intertemporal government budget constraint. Sargent presents some of his core messages right at the beginning. Here are some examples (quotes in italics taken from pp. 3-4):

1. The ability to borrow today depends on expectations about future revenues. Under the United States' first constitution, the federal government incurred very much debt but didn't have the power to tax accordingly. The consequence was that the respective debt titles traded at high discounts (I don't remember any passage explaining how this was even possible for the federal government---could it really have been ignorance of creditors?). This all changed under the second constitution which traded single states' taxing powers for a bail-out by the federal government.
2. Free-rider problems exist for subordinate governemnts vis-à-vis a central government, which amounts to the classic problem of how to make several parties pay for a public good (for example such a "Glorious Cause" as national independence). This problem was closely connected to the low 'bargaining power' of every single state in trade relations with Great Britain: No state could afford to increase tariffs and the like (the main source of tax revenues at the time) because it would have only benefited the neighboring states. In effect, tax competition made paying war debts on a state level almost impossible.
3. Good reputations can be costly to acquire. While the federal bail-out of the American states at the end of the 18th century created a strong reputation for some decades, a different kind of reputation was generated in the mid-19th century: When another federal bailout was discussed, opponents prevailed, exchanging the USAs standing on capital markets (which was now demolished) for a strong reputation of the federal government vis-à-vis state governments (that introduced balanced-budget rules soon after).

There is more in the article: Two additional lessons (It can help to sustain distinct reputations with different parties and Confused monetary-fiscal coordination creates costly uncertainties). Some math, 80% of which seems a little out of place, but I guess it wouldn't be considered a 'real Sargent' if the paper didn't contain at least a few formulae. And finally, some very nice quotes:

• On economic theory (p. 8, italics added): "For the purpose of (...) buyers and sellers, it is enough to have a good-fitting statistical model (...) But for other purposes, a statistical model alone is inadequate. (...) Economic theory goes deeper by analyzing contending economic and political forces that actually produce a statistical regime."
• Directly following, but worth a separate mention: "In economic theory, an agent is a constrained optimization problem. A model consists of a collection of constrained optimization problems. Theories of general equilibrium, games, and macroeconomics acquire power by deploying an equilibrium concept whose role is to organize disparate choice problems by casting them within a coherent environment."
• A joke at the expense of Milton Friedman (footnote 18).
• "Prejucides help because data are limited." (footnote 20)

What it didn't do was go into much (i.e. only some) detail about "Europe now", which is what you'd clearly expect from the title. Just strike that out, enjoy the rest, and possibly have a look at another historical article by Sargent (co-authored by Francois Velde (1995): "Macroeconomic Features of the French Revolution", Journal of Political Economy, 103 (3), 474-518) if you're interested.

Papers We Read: Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics (bs)

In our yesterdays session, we discussed another paper of Mister Shin, this time a piece he published with Mister Adrian:

Adrian, T. and Shin, H.S. (2011), "Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics", Handbook of Monetary Economics, edition 1, volume 3, pp. 601-650.

Here are some key findings:

It seems to be a stylized fact that shifts in the (short-term) policy rate translate directly into shifts in the slope of the yield curve. For this to hold, longer rates must be somewhat stickier than short rates. This is empirically proven by Figure 1 (p.604, see below), which states an almost 1:1 negative relation between changes in the fed fund rate and the term spread.

A higher term spread has important implications for the banking business because it increases its profitability. Hence, the future risk-taking capacity of the banking industry is fostered and thereby credit supply increases. That is, procyclicality in loan supply is explained by the variation of the slope of the yield curve. The risk-taking channel of financial intermediaries - effective also because the banking system is financed increasingly short-term and market-based - entails the policy implication that the short-rate is an important price variable on its own. This stays in contrast to the widely held view of monetary policy that short-rates are simply an instrument to steer longer rates, ultimately the ones that are relevant for consumption and investement decisions. Incremental variations in short-rates can have detrimental effects on a wide range of transactions made by market-based institutions. As the authors argue, for SIV a difference of a quarter percent in funding costs may make all the difference between a profitable venture and a loss-making one (p.605).

It remains a puzzle why financial intermediaries haven't realized those potential funding risks prior to the crisis. It also poses the question if monetary policy was aware of the amplification mechanism that arise because of bank's active balance sheet management. I assume, it was not. Nevertheless, the FED became increasingly tighter in the run-up to the crisis - argueably practiced some sort of "leaning against the wind policy", at least from  2004-2006.

Sadly enough, this tightening did not wind up risky short-term funding or made the financial system any safer. I guess, there is more to come...

Papers We Read: Procyclicality and Monetary Aggregates (cps)

The semester's over in Hohenheim and so is the weekly frequency of our paper sessions. However, we got around to another one this week and discussed a paper that's already been out for some time:

Shin, Hyun Song and Kwanho Shin (2011): "Procyclicality and Monetary Aggregates", NBER Working Paper No. 16836, National Bureau of Economic Research.

Abstract:

Financial intermediaries borrow in order to lend. When credit is increasing rapidly, the traditional deposit funding (core liabilities) is supplemented with other funding (non-core liabilities). We explore the hypothesis that monetary aggregates reflect the size of non-core and core liabilities and hence convey information on the stage of the financial cycle. In emerging economies with open capital markets, non-core liabilities of the banking system take the form of short-term foreign exchange liabilities, increasing the vulnerability to the outbreak of “twin crises” where a liquidity crisis is compounded by a currency crisis.

While we neither want to disrespect the authors nor South Korea as an economy, we found that the first, general parts of the paper were most notable and generously skipped some 'empirical' parts, considering them back-up for the ideas introduced before. Like that, the paper's a pleasantly short yet interesting read.

Melts In Your Mouth, Not In Your Hand (cps)

Fun news with minor policy implications: Canadian 50 and 100 Dollar banknotes apparently deform when exposed to heat, where 'heat' means as little as your car on a hot summer's day. I had so many stupid jokes planned out, but I guess everyone who reported about this already included some sort of pun. Therefore, I'll keep it short and end with a straight-to-the-point high-end-journalism quote: "I don't think the Canadian $100 bill should be weaker than two-ply toilet paper."

Papers We Read: The Run on Repo (cps)

Part of working at a university is, of course, to discuss what's going on in the profession. At our chair, this includes a (preferably) weekly session in which we discuss (preferably) current academic papers, largely in the field of monetary macroeconomics. While we don't claim to become (let alone be) agenda setters in this respect, we thought the readers of our blog, especially students who have already advanced in their studies and aim for more than just passing exams, might be interested in this as well. So here it is for this week:

Gorton, Gary and Andrew Metrick (2012), "Securitized lending and the run on repo", Journal of Financial Economics, 104 (3), 425-451.¹

Abstract: 

The panic of 2007–2008 was a run on the sale and repurchase market (the repo market), which is a very large, short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization activities and financial institutions. Repo transactions are collateralized, frequently with securitized bonds. We refer to the combination of securitization plus repo finance as “securitized banking” and argue that these activities were at the nexus of the crisis. We use a novel data set that includes credit spreads for hundreds of securitized bonds to trace the path of the crisis from subprime-housing related assets into markets that had no connection to housing. We find that changes in the LIB-OIS spread, a proxy for counterparty risk, were strongly correlated with changes in credit spreads and repo rates for securitized bonds. These changes implied higher uncertainty about bank solvency and lower values for repo collateral. Concerns about the liquidity of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo haircuts, that is the amount of collateral required for any given transaction. With declining asset values and increasing haircuts, the US banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression.

¹ There's also an NBER Working Paper version in case you don't have access to the published article.

Mr. Crony Capitalism (amv)

Warum Spitzenpolitiker in Aufsichtsräten der Großindustrie sitzen, ist recht offensichtlich. Für Thyssen-Krupp hat sich nach Recherchen des Handelsblatts Peer Steinbrück eingesetzt: hier (HB) und hier (FAZ):

Der SPD-Kanzlerkandidat Peer Steinbrück hat in seiner Zeit als Thyssen-Krupp-Aufsichtsrat dem Stahlkonzern seine politische Hilfe für günstigere Strompreise angeboten. Das geht aus einem Protokoll des Aufsichtsrats vom 31. Januar vergangenen Jahres hervor, das dem Handelsblatt vorliegt.  

Während der Sitzung kritisierte ein Vertreter der Arbeitnehmerseite die hohen Stromkosten für deutsche Industriekunden. Steinbrück sagte daraufhin laut Protokoll, „wenn aus dem Kreis des Aufsichtsrats eine Initiative (...) ergriffen werde, sei er gerne zur politischen Unterstützung bereit.“ Als energieintensives Unternehmen würde Thyssen-Krupp von einer Senkung der Strompreise massiv profitieren.

Überraschenderweise:

Aufsichtsratschef Gerhard Cromme nahm laut Sitzungsprotokoll Steinbrücks „Anregung gerne auf.“ 

In diesem Zusammenhang lohnt auch die Erinnerung an Steinbrücks Rolle im Fall der West LB. Mr. Crony Capitalism eben.

New Year's Resolutions (cps)

I'm a sucker for cheap wordplays, so here's another one: Before we all lose our sober look tomorrow (ta-taaa!, now click the link ;), take a brief moment to think about what might be coming next year... Maybe it will be negative deposit rates for European banks so as to increase the incentive to lend out instead of just carrying funds obtained from ECB LTROs. A possible implication is the reduction of TARGET2 balances and a move toward financial re-integration because of newly sparked search-for-yield behavior. Another outcome might be that solid banks just pay back 'unused' LTRO borrowings and go on about their business (or even be better off?) for a while whereas not-so-solid banks... well, let's just exercise a little more and quit smoking. Guten Rutsch!


By the way, I wonder whether 'allocation' is a euphemism or synonym for 'search-for-yield behavior' and whether all of this could be part of 'safeguarding monetary policy transmission.'

NGDP targeting - we are (almost) there (bs)

Probably not just our dear colleague amv is all excited about the FED's new conditional QE3 program. In contrast to previous rounds of QE, now the FED announced to tailor its asset purchases to explicit targets of economic activity and inflation:

 [...] the Committee decided to keep the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and currently anticipates that this exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent, inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term inflation expectations continue to be well anchored. The Committee views these thresholds as consistent with its earlier date-based guidance. In determining how long to maintain a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy [...]

As popular proponents of NGDP level targeting posit (here), this step comes very close to the desired policy change.

A rough estimate of Spanish recapitalization needs (ls)

I aim to provide a rough estimate of future losses of the Spanish banking system, therey pinning down its potential need for recapitaliziation out of ESM funds.  Data mainly comes from the Bank of Spain. I do not claim to obtain estimates accounting for endogenous feedback loops, it is rather a rule-of-thumb exercise which nevertheless sheds some light on the sufficiency of current rescue packages.

Total assets of Spanish financial institutions equal some €5.2 Trillion. The stock of aggregate credit is €2.0 Trillion. Securitiy Holdings amount to €1.2 Trillion. Roughly €400 bn of government debt is held by residents and probably €300 bn from financial instutions. 

How about losses from the stock of credit? The ratio of non-performing loans currently stands at about 10%, implying that €200 billion of credit are underwater. A commonly used benchmark for recovery rates is 40 percent, however, it is reasonable to assume an inverse relation between NPL-ratios and recovery rate since a large number of NPLs implies lots of liquidations which depresses collateral prices and hence recovery rates. I therefore assume a recovery rate of 30%. Additionally, one has to account for losses which banks yet have accounted for with the help of (dynamic) provisioning. I heroically assume that 33% of future losses are covered yet.

Thus, expected losses from the credit stock are: €200 bn x 30% x 67% = 40.2€ Billion

How about losses from securitiy holdings? By assumption, about 300€ bn of securities carry exposure against the government. Spains Debt-to GDP Level is projected to rise to 90% in 2013. Returning to the Maastricht criteria would call for a 33% haircut. Admittedly, this is an unrealistic worst-case scenario but useful for illustration. In this case, losses amount 100€bn.

Note that I abstract from potential losses out of interbank exposures. I do so because I assume that removing NPL-risk and haircut risk essentially removes the two main drivers of aggegate Spanish bank risk and stabilizes the system such that no interbank defults occur.  

Hence, total projected losses add up to 140€ bn. The financial system's aggregate equity position is about €400bn. So 35% are likely to be siphoned off in the next years, leaving the system with roughly €250 bn equity in relation to total assets of five trillion Euros, i..e the system would operate with a prohibitively high leverage ratio of 19:1. In order to avoid such unfavourable outcomes, European leaders agreed to inject €100 bn into the shaken Spanish banking system.

My rule-of-thumb calculation indicates this is very likely to turn out as insufficient. Clearly, my government debt scenario is very pessimistic. But note in contrast the exterme vulnerability of expected losses from credit against worsening recovery rates and worsening NPLs. It seems as we need an additional rescue package...

Thanks for the "Invitation", Hellas! (bs)

...ehm, or should I rather say: Thank you, EFSF?! Well, I'm not really invited, anyway. But those of you, who are, just some quick notes:

1. Show your greek debt at the entrance (max 10 billion)
2. To be on the guest list, send an email until Friday, 5:00 p.m. 
3. If you are still not sure how to get there, here is the map for you, guys.

Well then, have fun!

MTR vs. Deutsche Bahn (bs)

After a trip to Hong Kong last week, I'm very impressed with Chinese efficiency. Especially riding the metro is pure pleasure. The operating company is called Mass Transit Railway Corporation (or just MTR). In fact, the firm could really serve as a role model for our various underperforming Municipal Transport Services - just think of Berlin's infamous S-Bahn, DB's S21 or whatsoever.

Here are some facts. MTR is one of the most profitable transport companies of the world. Its annual revenue is about 800 million Euros. In terms of costumer service (literally everywhere in Hong Kong you can pay with MTR's Octopus Card), punctuality and reliability, MTR wins one award after the other. And although the company yields about one third of its revenue with ticket sales, riding the MTR is really cheap. After heavily using it for one week, I didn't spend more than 15 Euros. By the way, the remaining two thirds of its revenue, MTR makes running Shopping Centers and other businesses located around the stations.

As the rumour goes (Berliner Zeitung), MTR is considering to become an investor in Berlin's S-Bahn. Great news, one is tempted to say...

Weidmann calls for Capital Requirements on Government Bonds (ls)

He is very right. Please find the speech here.

Teaser (unfortunately only in German, emphasis added):

Banken müssen darüber hinaus aber stärker darin gezügelt werden, sich übermäßigen staatlichen Solvenzrisiken auszusetzen. Dazu muss die Bankenunion durch weitere regulatorische Maßnahmen flankiert werden. Zwei sind mir besonders wichtig, und beide zielen letztlich darauf ab, Forderungen an den Staat nicht länger gegenüber anderen bilanziellen Aktiva zu privilegieren: Erstens sollte es eine Obergrenze, eine Art Großkreditbeschränkung, für das Engagement einzelner Banken gegenüber staatlichen Schuldnern geben; zweitens, sollten Banken Staatsanleihen oder Kredite an den Staat entsprechend deren Risiko mit Eigenkapital unterlegen.

Die Eigenkapitalunterlegung von Staatsanleihen hätte noch einen weiteren Vorteil: Sie würde dazu führen, dass frühzeitiger Preissignale gesendet würden, wenn sich eine unsolide Entwicklung der Staatsfinanzen abzeichnet – es entstünde Druck zur Konsolidierung. Zusammen mit der gemeinsamen Aufsicht würde dies verhindern, dass Staaten trotz einer Schieflage im Haushalt weiter billige Kredite erhalten und so nicht nur sich selbst, sondern auch die Banken noch tiefer in Haushaltsproblemen verstricken.

Wie wichtig es ist, hier höhere Schranken zu setzen, zeigt die gegenwärtige Entwicklung: Es gehört mittlerweile zwar zum guten Ton, die enge Verbindung von Staatsfinanzen und nationalen Bankensystemen zu kritisieren. Angesichts der Geldnöte einzelner Länder ermuntern viele dann aber doch die dortigen Banken, immer mehr Anleihen des eigenen Staates zu kaufen.

Peer Steinbrück der Finanzmarktexperte? (amv)

Von wegen! Die Dokumentation "die story - Größenwahn und Selbstbedienung - Der Krimi um die Millionen der West-LB" des WDR weckt große Zweifel bezüglich der Kompetenz und des Verantwortungsbewusstseins des Vizekanzlerkandidaten, damals Finanzminister in NRW (auch andere Akteure kommen schlecht weg). Bedenkt man zudem, dass Steinbrücks Ruf als Finanzexperte insbesondere auf der Rettung von Landesbanken und ähnlichen Institutionen ohne Geschäftsmodell beruht, ist sein Nimbus als 'Experte' kaum begründbar.

EE-T: Economics e-Translations

Some of us participate in the EE-T project (Economics e-Translations) which is funded by the European Commission in the framework of the Lifelong Learning Programme Erasmus sub programme:

"The EE-T project has the objective to assess the impact of translations of economic texts on the History of Economic Thought in Europe. Historical and linguistic analysis of the different translations is indeed necessary to fully understand the circulation of economic ideas, in order to provide a richer approach to the History of Economic Thought."

Read more and view the database at the website of the EE-T project.

Complex systems and simple regulation (ls)

As always, the recent Jackson Hole conference has been a source of excellent contributions. I find the speech of Andy Haldane most notably.

Some teasers:

Modern finance is complex, perhaps too complex. Regulation of modern finance is complex, almost certainly too complex. That configuration spells trouble. As you do not fight fire with fire, you do not fight complexity with complexity. Because complexity generates uncertainty, not risk, it requires a regulatory response grounded in simplicity, not complexity.

Delivering that would require an about-turn from the regulatory community from the path followed for the better part of the past 50 years. If a once-in-a-lifetime crisis is not able to deliver that change, it is not clear what will. To ask today’s regulators to save us from tomorrow’s crisis using yesterday’s toolbox is to ask a border collie to catch a frisbee by first applying Newton’s Law of Gravity.

A tremendously striking result is displayed with the following regression:

Obviously, risk-based capital ratios - even though they are calculated with state-of-the-art risk management models -  have virtually no explanatory power for the probability of bank failure. A simple rule of thumb is clearly superior, namely a combination of the unweighted leverage ratio and GDP growth. 

Super Mario and the Bazooka (ls)

Todays meeting of the ECB governing council has been eagerly awaited. ECB President Draghi fueled market expectations of a large-scale government bond purchase programme with some statements given in London a few days ago (see here). However, todays announcements are vague and disappointing. Markets expected a 'Bazooka-Solution', Draghi rather gave them a shot out of a Super-Soaker-Gun.

I  believe that the concept of central bank independence and monetary policy from the ivory tower is not suitable for a crisis of unprecedented scale as we do witness right now. While political unification of the EMU is not feasible in the short run, the ECB needs to do a dirty job. Hiding behind legal concerns and phrases such as 'ensuring the functioning of the monetary transmision mechanism' is ineffective. Our central bank is compromising itself step-by-step. Starting with the relaxation of collateral requirements we came to purchases of both covered and government bonds. In fact, the term 'unconventional policy measures' is an euphemism. The ECB is actively engaging in fiscal policy, and the established frontier between government and central bank balance sheets becomes increasingly blurred. To be clear, I am not complaining about this developements. I believe that these steps are necessary. But they should be communicated in an honest and transparent way in order to remove uncertainty and to boost market sentiment.Let me make some examples from todays press conference:

The Governing Council extensively discussed the policy options to address the severe malfunctioning in the price formation process in the bond markets of euro area countries. Exceptionally high risk premia are observed in government bond prices in several countries and financial fragmentation hinders the effective working of monetary policy. Risk premia that are related to fears of the reversibility of the euro are unacceptable, and they need to be addressed in a fundamental manner. The euro is irreversible. 

What is a severe malfunctioning in the price formation process? Is the ECB showing sympathy for a theory of multiple equilibria on government bond markets à la de Grauwe? Does she believe that current risk premia show signs of exaggeration? How to decompose risk premia into solvency concerns and concerns about an exit of the EMU?  And what about financial fragmentation? Maybe fragmented markets with persistent spreads are the new fundamental? It is now well known that the virtually non-existent spreads in the pre-crisis regime have to be attributed to a considerable extent to undifferentiated collateral and capital requirements. And by the way: Recent LTROs fostered fragmentation, since PIIGS-banks acquired governement bonds with a considerable home bias, thereby further intensifying potentially adverse feedback channels between government and bank solvency. All in all, the statement above lacks of guidance and leaves markets and observers puzzled.

In order to create the fundamental conditions for such risk premia to disappear, policy-makers in the euro area need to push ahead with fiscal consolidation, structural reform and European institution-building with great determination. As implementation takes time and financial markets often only adjust once success becomes clearly visible, governments must stand ready to activate the EFSF/ESM in the bond market when exceptional financial market circumstances and risks to financial stability exist – with strict and effective conditionality in line with the established guidelines.

Stressing conditionality again and again seems to be merely a lip service.The examples of Greece and Italy (Just remember Mr Berlusconi's reluctance to stick to his commitment to structural reforms after ECB interventions eased the refinancing pressure on his country!) show that conditionality is unrealisitic if not dynamically inconsistent. We rather witness dynamic bargaining processes which are constrained by political feasibility and the fear of disordered government defaults and their systemic implications.   

The Governing Council, within its mandate to maintain price stability over the medium term and in observance of its independence in determining monetary policy, may undertake outright open market operations of a size adequate to reach its objective. In this context, the concerns of private investors about seniority will be addressed. Furthermore, the Governing Council may consider undertaking further non-standard monetary policy measures according to what is required to repair monetary policy transmission. Over the coming weeks, we will design the appropriate modalities for such policy measures.

This is good news. But more details are needed. What about implicit yield targets? Any hints concerning the volume of this operations? What is meant by 'further non-standard monetary policy measures'? And seriously: It's not about ensuring price stability or repairing the transmission mechanism. It's about fixing this crisis. Quick. Let's hope that ECB communication will become more transparent and precise within the next weeks.  

Will on-tap liquidity eventually burst the bubble of fear? (bs)

In a recent post on FT Alphaville Izabella Kaminska is positive about this. She goes on explaining how the investor’s run on safe assets results in negative rates which “destroy the vital process by which economies form capital, grow and generate employment”. Skeptical on the power of monetary policy to circumvent such a bad (temporary but potentially persistent) equilibrium, Keynes envisaged fiscal policy to intervene.

"It was the government’s superior capacity to bear risk — not any inherent belief in its capacity to make better decisions — that led Keynes to advocate greater state-led investment when the economy becomes gripped by a bubble of fear."

And something else is worth noticing: financial repression, prominently criticized by the newly appointed Harvard Professor Carmen Reinhart,

“is no accident. It is the deliberate objective of a policy designed to curb the demand for liquid assets and force greater willingness to commit to less liquid forms of investment.”

So far so good!

Yet one statement struck me as pretty innovative.  Because the system is (allegedly) completely overwhelmed with capacity, we need to deploy capital by shifting demand to non-material assets like human interaction, health care, education etc. Only then, the author posits, will capital become scarce again and thus positive yields on investment will be revived.

“ Of course if that is the case, the fear bubble won’t so much burst, as eat itself out.”

Low yields - why and where? (ls)

The Economist published an excellent article on why yields in mature economies continue to be close to zero despite of rising debt ratios. Please find it here.

Key statements:

Add together the purchases of global central banks, domestic central banks (via QE) and financially repressed institutions, and well over half of British and American government bonds may be owned by investors who are relatively unconcerned about low yields. Mutual-fund and hedge-fund managers, more bothered about making a decent return, are thus hard put to play the role of vigilantes, so the state of the market is no longer the economic signal that once it was.

This division of bond markets into a premier league (of governments that can borrow at less than 2%) and the minor leagues (of those paying 6% or more) is a great advantage to those countries in the former category. America and Britain, in particular, can finance very high deficits (by historic standards) without feeling under pressure. Indeed, despite many years of current-account deficits, both countries have a surplus on their investment-income accounts, largely because foreigners earn such low yields on their dollar and sterling deposits and bonds. It is a neat trick: buy real goods and services from other countries and sell them low-yielding pieces of paper in return. And it looks like one that may have a fair bit of mileage left. Investors starved for choice may not relish yield-free bonds. But they seem likely to keep buying them.

And the Band Played On (cps)

Here's a management summary of what the fine folks at Goldman Sachs think about Operation Twist:

"Bernanke rearranged the deck chairs on the Titanic again."