Showing posts with label Truck and Barter. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Truck and Barter. Show all posts

Wednesday, December 14, 2011

10 inconvenient Euro-truths by David Marsh (amv)

Excellent post by David Marsh (OMFIF):
Below are 10 key facts on the present position of the euro that many people overlook. Perhaps the most salient point concerns the direction of trade flows - the opposite of what you might expect. A classic case of ‘man bites dog’. The UK, a resolute non-member of the euro, has been busy over the past decade building trade ties with EMU. Yet Germany, in whose name and with whose currency monetary union was built, has been successfully integrating with the non-euro area – with fast-growing states in non-EMU Europe and Asia – and is doing progressively less trade with the euro bloc. Germany’s relative trade links with the peripheral countries have fallen particularly sharply. Considering these countries’ financing requires so much treasure from the taxpayers of Germany and other creditor countries, the imbalance between falling trade and rising demand for finance is at the bottom of the growing reluctance of the creditor countries to pledge more money to solve the conundrum. Confused about all this? Now read on.  

Sunday, August 28, 2011

Jackson Hole Economic Symposium (fg)





Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium 2011.

Papers include topics on 'Assessing Current Trends in Global Growth', 'Balancing Growth with Equity', 'Managing Natural Resources in Developing Economies', 'Regulating Financial Markets and Institutions to Promote Growth, and 'Aligning International Capital Flows with Growth'.

A paper I find worth mentioning is from R. Levine on regulating financial markets and insitutions to promote growth:
A broader, long-run consideration of financial development suggests that financial innovation is essential for growth. [...] Without corresponding innovations in finance that match the increases in complexity associated with economic growth, the quality of the financial services diminishes, slowing future growth
Furthermore, both bank and stock market development are independently
associated with growth, suggesting that the policy debate about whether to promote a bank-based system or a market-based financial system misses the big point. Banks and markets matter for growth.

Monday, August 15, 2011

A response to Nick Rowe: Fragility at the limit (amv)

I promised Nick Rowe to respond to his post on what he calls "fragility at the limit'. It is a follow-up on the debate on Kocherlakota's argument that it is possible to determine long-run inflation expectations by setting nominal yields according to the Fisher relation. Let me start with a disclaimer: I do not believe that central banking is or should be using nominal yields in the way Kocherlakota suggests. I am interested in the theoretical model underlying Kocherlakota's argument. I further believe there is a grain of truth in his statement, since I 'believe' in long-run neutrality. As I mentioned many times before, I side with Sumner & his allies on NGDP- or (at least) price-level targeting.

Nick introduces an interesting argument. If I got him right, he accepts that Kocherlakota's argument is a sound REE-prediction. He however argues that the model is 'fragile'. To show what he means, he partitions the set of agents by defining a fraction f of adaptive agents on [0,1] (and, accordingly, a fraction (1-f) of RE-agents). The same fraction partitions the bahavior of firms, that is, f gives the fraction of sluggish price setters, while (1-f) gives the set of instantaneous price setters.

He starts with f=1 and argues, correctly, that an 1% increase in nominal yields suggests a 1% increase in real yields and, thus, initiates a sluggish deflationary (or disinflationary) process. As f approaches zero, that is, as the fraction of RE-agents who adjust prices instantaneously increases, the same 1% increase in nominal yields results in ever faster deflationary processes. As f approaches zero, increasing nominal yields suggests "instant explosive deflation". At the limit, however, that is, for f=0, Kocherlakota's model applies, that is, a 1% increase in nominal yields suggest 1% higher inflation expectations.

Nick concludes: "Suppose that the predictions in the limit (as the assumptions approached the model's assumptions) were totally different from the predictions at the limit. That would be a model that is fragile in the limit. And that, to my mind, would be a totally useless model."

Now, in this post I do not want to talk about monetary policy. As I mentioned before (in some comment section), I dislike DeGrauwe-type models, because they suggest that RE is a restriction on individual behavior. I rather side with Arrow, who convincingly argues that RE as an individual assumption is prohibitively restrictive. RE is a general equilibrium notion; REE defines a class of GE models; REE-price systems reflect information as if agents had the super-human capabilities Arrow is referring to. What is needed, of course, is some kind of mechanism, like Sandroni's market selection process, that establishes convergence in case of agents with bounded cognitive and information-processing capabilities. In case of monetary macro models, other learning processes are relevant, like Howitt's, who argues that if QTM-logic applies, and if central banks can manipulate nominal interest rates only by adjusting monetary base in the inverse direction, then a Kocherlakota-type REE is unlearnable. Note, however, that this is about the REE's dynamic stability and not about Nick's concept of 'fragility at the limit'.

To show what I mean, let me take an example that is totally unrelated to monetary policy. Let me talk about the Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu results (SMD). The Debreu version (1974) claims that given any function, say g, from the unit price simplex to a k-dimensional commodity space satisfying continuity, homogeneity, Walras's Law, and a boundary condition, then for every compact subset of the price simplex there exists an exchange economy with k 'well-behaved' agents such that the aggregate excess demand of that economy is equal to g(p) on the compact subset. Thus, if structure is imposed by restrictions on individuals (those restrictions that suggest utility and profit maximization),  most of it is lost by aggregation (only continuity, homogeneity, and Walras' Law survive the adding-up of individual demands). Thus, sufficiency conditions for global uniqueness and global stability imposed on the system like gross substitutionality do not have microfoundations.

The SMD results are true for arbitrary dispersions of individual characteristics like preference and endowments. Imagine a convergent sequence of Arrow-Debreu exchange economies with a large but finite number of agents and commodities, decreasing in the dispersions of such primitives. States differently: for any sufficiently large n in the index set we have arbitrary dispersions of primitives; as n increases, dispersion decreases; in the limit, all agents have identical preferences and endowments. The last such economy in the sequence before we reach the limit is one with identical preferences and collinear endowments. As shown by Kirman and Koch (1986), the SMD results still apply. Up to this economy, there is no hope for global uniqueness and stability. But this is evidently not true for the limit economy, which in fact is a quasi-Crusoe economy. Global uniqueness and stability is trivial. Thus, as in Nick's framework, the sequence is discontinuous, that is, it jumps at the limit.

According to Nick's definition, we can say that the SMD results are 'fragile at the limit'. But his core statements that this implies 'uselessness' does not follow. It just tells us if we find an economy with strictly identical agents, we can hope for global uniqueness and stability. Otherwise, we have to make other restrictions than those on individuals (see Werner Hildenbrand on this). What this shows is that Nick's argument is not generically true as it is implied to be. An even though the SMD results tell us something about global stability of each economy in our sequence (or rather the lack thereof), Nick's notion of 'fragility at the limit' is about the continuity properties of a sequence of models (or rather about the lack thereof). As he insists, many economist do not pay enough attention to stability properties. I also believe that this is important. But as I tried to argue, his notion of 'fragility at the limit' is not concerned with dynamic stability issues.

Friday, June 24, 2011

Moral hazard matters! (amv)

Ich habe fremdgebloggt. Kantoos war so freundlich, mich als Gastblogger zu rekrutieren. Meinen Beitrag findet ihr hier.

UPDATE: F. Luebberding diskutiert mit.

Meine Replik (bei Kantoos):

zu "Die Politik hatte sich bis 2007 immer an diesem Konsens orientiert. Die Folgen sieht man heute. Das ist auch der Grund, warum sich niemand mehr für den Marktkonsens interessiert. Man kann sich nämlich auch gemeinsam irren. Weil Märkte aber nach Ansicht einiger Zeitgenossen a priori nicht kollektiv irren können, muss man natürlich eine Erklärung finden, dass sie a posteriori doch eine tiefere Wahrheit antizpierten."

Habe ich nicht explizit die Möglichkeit des ex-ante Irrtums eingeräumt? Meine gesamte Argumentationslinie (basierend auf der Systemintelligenz des Marktes) basiert darauf. Dass sich alle gemeinsam irren können, stimmt zwar, aber wenn alle dieselben falschen Erwartungen haben, kommt kein Assethandel zustande.

Es muss immer jemand bereit sein, eine Gegenposition einzunehmen. Insoweit muss es ex post zu eine Reallokation von Marktzugang kommen, und zwar hin zu den relativ besseren Entscheidern.

Ansonsten kann ich es kurz machen: der gesamte Beitrag ist eine völlige Falschdarstellung meiner Argumentation. Luebberding hängt sich an einer Aussage auf, die ich nicht getroffen habe. Vielleicht hätte er meinen Beitrag lesen sollen (oder dabei die Ideologie-Brille abnehmen).

UPDATE 2: Hier ein wichtiger Punkt, der sich aus der Debatte ergeben hat (siehe die Kommentarsektion bei Kantoos Economics):

@ aloa: "Ich rede von Gewinnen. Und wenn, dann wäre das einzige was interessiert wie sich die akkummulierten Gewinne über die Jahre im Verhältnis zum Verlust am Ende verhalten. Und auch das nur wenn überhaupt(!) diejenigen welche die Gewinne einfahren mit denen welche die Verluste am Ende einfahren identisch sind."


Sehr guter Punkt! Auch wenn ich Deine Schlußfolgerung nicht teile. Du weist zurecht auf ein Problem hin. Wenn eine Falschentscheidung eine Serie von Kapitalgewinnen produziert und erst dann Kapitalverluste zur Folge hat, dann scheint es auf die Relation von frühen Gewinnen und späten Verlusten zu achten. Hier ein paar Punkte:
(1) Eine Entscheidung, die frühe Erträge und späte Verluste bringt nennt man eine Disinvestition. Sol eine Entscheidung ist oft sinnvoll und nicht von vornherein als Zeichen von Fehlverhalten zu interptetieren. Sie ist immer dann rational, wenn irgendwo in der globalen Ökonomik eine Investition derart produktiv erscheint, dass es lohnend wird anderswo Ressourcen freizugeben. So führt ein extrem hoher Renditevorsprung einer Investition dazu, dass vermehrt Geldkapital zur Realisierung nachgefragt wird. Ist sind die betroffenen Sektoren signifikant (groß und/oder zahlreich), dann steigt der Zins (ggf. auch weil Risikoprämien steigen, weil der Markt ins Risiko geht). Steigende Zinsen diskriminieren gegen andere Investitionsprojekte und gleichzeitig erhöhen sie die Renatibilität von Disinvestitionen (der relative Kapitalwert solcher Aktivitäten steigen). Insgesamt werden die Ressourcen zur produktiveren Verwendung freigesetzt.

(2) Hingegen ist es problematisch, wenn eine rationale "Blase’ (ich benutze den Begriff unter Vorbehalten)vorliegt: man reitet auf steigenden Preisen mit, wohlwissend dass die Preise sich von den Fundamentaldaten entfernen, in der Hoffnung, frühzeitig abspringen zu können, d.h. bevor die Verluste deutlich werden. Wenn hinreichend viele so handeln, entsteht eine rationale Blase. Aber nur die wenigsten können diese Hoffnung realisieren; qua Natur der Sache. Das bedeutet, dass die überwiegende Zahl der Blasen-Reiter ihre Ressourcen verliert und zwar an die anderen Marktteilnehmer, inklusive derjenigen Minderheit, die sich schnell genug verabschiedet hat. Nur letztere werden dafür belohnt, eine Blase mit herbeigeführt zu haben. Ein Problem entsteht aber nur, wenn diese Gruppe SYSTEMATISCH GLÜCK hat, rechtzeitig abzuspringen. Systematisch Glück haben ist aber mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit ausgeschlossen.

Ich bleibe dabei: Wenn die Politik die Verlierer systematisch rettet, ist die nächste Krise am wahrscheinlichsten.

Saturday, May 14, 2011

In defense of speculation (amv)

'Noah Smith' explains why speculation on futures markets stabilizes spot prices. Good stuff!

Monday, April 18, 2011

Grüner Zeitgeist: Protektionismus (amv)

Hier eine interessante Studie von Thomas Bernauer zur Frage: Sind umweltbewusste Personen Protektionisten? Die Antwort ist wenig überraschend.
Ergebnisse:
Insgesamt lässt sich feststellen, dass Individuen mit stärkerem Umweltbewusstsein eine kritischere Haltung gegenüber der wirtschaftlichen Globalisierung insgesamt an den Tag legen und eher protektionistische Massnahmen befürworten. Vereinfacht formuliert: Wenn sich das Umweltbewusstsein einer Person von einer Standardabweichung unterhalb auf eine Standardabweichung oberhalb des Mittelwertes erhöht – dies entspricht ungefähr einer 35%igen Zunahme der Stärke der Umweltpräferenz innerhalb der tatsächlich beobachteten Werte auf dieser Variable – steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer protektionistischen Einstellung um durchschnittlich rund 10%. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass aussenwirtschaftliche Präferenzen von diversen Faktoren beeinflusst werden, ist dieser Zusammenhang beachtlich. Er liegt ungefähr in der Grössenordnung des Effekts von Faktoren, die traditionellerweise von der Aussenhandelstheorie in den Vordergrund gestellt werden (v.a. die wirtschaftlichen Umverteilungseffekte von Freihandel). Die Grafik zeigt, dass der Zusammenhang auch bei unterschiedlichen Formulierungen der Protektionismus-Frage in die gleiche Richtung tendiert und statistisch weitgehend signifikant ist.
Warum internationaler Handel eine durch und durch gute Sache ist, erklärt Tom Palmer in 3 Minuten (für Dummies):



Ich habe Tom in meiner Zeit beim Cato Institute kennengelernt. Bis heute kenne ich niemanden, der so belesen ist. Intellektuell ist er ein Gigant; menschlich ist er mehr als das.

Monday, January 31, 2011

Weimann über Subventionslawinen am Beispiel der Photovoltaik (amv)

Hervorragender Beitrag in der FAZ.net.

Thursday, October 28, 2010

Cochrane vs. Geithner (amv)

A brilliant WSJ-article by John Cochrane:
Teaser: Since when is every trade surplus or deficit an "external imbalance" in need of correction? It makes sense for a country that has good investment prospects to import a lot of goods, run trade deficits, and borrow money. Years later, the country puts the resulting products on boats to pay the lenders back. The U.S. borrowed abroad to finance our railroads in the 19th century and ran surpluses when Europe was rebuilding after World War II. Were these "imbalances"?
HT Mankiw

Monday, October 25, 2010

Venezuelan economics (amv)

From Mankiw's Blog:
[T]his picture shows the kind of things you find when you go to a Mercado Bicentenario in Venezuela (which is the new name of a chain of private markets -Cada and Exito- recently expropiated and now runned by the Government). This one is from Mercado Bicentenario, in Centro Comercial Ciudad Tamanaco (CCCT), a mall, in Caracas, Venezuela:




It says:

Description of the product: Diana Oil.

Fair Price: 4,73 Bfs.

Capitalist Price: 7 Bfs.

% of savings: 32%

I think the poster should be extended by one of the following no-free-lunch restrictions:
 
either by:
Please don't be surprised to find your demand unsatisfied. For prices below the market level there is just not enough supply for everyone.
 
or:
You pay the difference by taxes. Please check your recent payroll.
 
or:
The difference is paid by those who import Venezuela's natural resources. We could have invested such rents in education and infrastructure. Instead, we want to consume them today. Who cares about our children?! Vote Chavez! 

Wednesday, October 13, 2010

Say's Law of Markets (amv)

Mario Rizzo on Say's Law. Good stuff!

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Market Watch II (amv)

Mumbai backs fg's interpretation. I believe that this is only part of the story. It's funny that "finance guys" - who after all believe in (weak) EMH  - see some rational bubbles whenever asset prices soar. Markets create liquidity; liquidity looks for the highest yield; Fed keeps risk-free yields low by creating even more liquidity; liquidity goes for risk; risk clusters and, eventually, markets collapse. I'm not arguing that this is wrong, even though I usually insist that such mechanism is conditional on regulations like hurdle rates imposed by legislation (like on life insurances). Certainly, the story is part of what is happening. The point is: when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail! The commodity market, however, is extremely heterogeneous. To get an idea of what I mean, click here. Gold follows a different logic than nickel or tin, which again follow a different logic than wheat or rice. The increase in wheat prices, for instance, is due to standard market conditions. Bad global harvest increases excess demand and wheat prices simply reflect this fact. Further, a weak dollar increases the excess demand for dollar-denominated commodities. And even though it is only a part of the story, the US certainly underperforms relative to global trends.

Thursday, August 12, 2010

The invisible hand once again (amv)

I couldn't resist to post this nice statement by Kenneth J. Arrow (AER, 1972):
From the time of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in 1776, one recurrent theme of economic analysis has been the remarkable degree of coherence among the vast numbers of individual and seemingly separate decisions about the buying and selling of commodities. In everyday, normal experience, there is something of a balance between the amounts of goods and services that some individuals want to supply and the amounts that other, different individuals want to sell. Would-be buyers ordinarily count correctly on being able to carry out their intentions, and would-be sellers do not ordinarily find themselves producing great amounts of goods that they cannot sell. This experience of balance is indeed so widespread that it raises no intellectual disquiet among laymen; they take it so much for granted that they are not disposed to understand the mechanism by which it occurs. The paradoxical result is that they have no idea of the system’s strength and are unwilling to trust it in any considerable departure from normal conditions.

Thursday, July 1, 2010

Saving, investment and all that (amv)

This is a first response to yesterday's debate on investment, saving, and all that. This is a huge subject, so I partition my response and begin with some aspect on the relationship between stocks and flows in the economy. My counterpart in the debate subscribes to the Keynesian view that stocks and portfolio choices dominate over flows and production and consumption choices. In Keynesian theory interest for instance is determined either by the interplay between the stock supply and stock demand for money or by the monetary authoritiy (and its control over the money supply). In neoclassical theory interest is determined solely by flows, by saving and investment as well as with changes in the supply of money and changes in hoardings. Post-Keynesians downplay the role of flows: Given the huge amount of assets accumulated in the past, flows like savings are not significant enough to impact on the investment and growth path of the economy (this argument is V. Chick's). In the traditional IS-LM model, still thaught to undergrads, for a given stock of money, each increase in aggregate demand and thus output is financed by dishoarding, by increasing interest rates and therewith the opportunity costs of hoalding money as a store-of-value. Again, for a given money supply, increasing interest rates increase velocity and the effective money supply (a flow!) which in turn allow demand components like investments to increase without any reduction in other components of spending. If the supply of money is a dependent variable (or made dependent by the monetary authority), the control of the level of aggragate activity in nominal terms is controlled by the banking system (or by policy).

But let me remain within the pure IS-LM model, without any banks or endogenous money. It suffices to reveal the stock view of Keynesian theory and the saving paradox. Here saving means simply non-spending, that is, saving is a leakage in the circular flow that reduces aggregate output, the demand for transaction demand of money, interest rates and thus the opportunity cost of holding money as an exit option in face of uncertainty. Thus, the act of saving finally decreases velocity. Of course, every neoclassical economists knew that given nominal rigididites, falling aggregate demand due to falling velocity reduces output and increases waste (unemployment). In neoclassical theory, increases in savings also reduce interest rates. It is also not denied that some of the money will be hoarded due to lower opportunity costs. But the flows saved by the households are assumed to form an excess supply of money capital, of means of finance, and to reduce the interest which signals a change in time preference. Firms do not need to know that preferences have changed. The system takes them by their profit motive so that they have only to maximize the present value of their activities: not only are financing costs lower, investment rankings adjust so that new capital intensive process climbes up the investment schedule while process that make use of old capital goods climb down. Accordingly, in addition to the excess supply of savings maintanence funds of inferior processes pour into the market to finance the formation of new capital. Note that Fisher's theory of interest is conceptualized for a progressive economy (as Lutz points out). Of course, a positive rate of time preference assures that interest is positive in stationarity, since accumulation breaks down as soon as the marginal productivity has fallen to a level equal to the social rate of time preference. In any way, interest is an intertemporal price relation, determined by productivity and thrift, that is, by technological knowledge, resource endowments, and preferences.

The backbone of all modern economic theory is the Arrow-Debreu economy. This model is static, but intertemporal choice is introduced by dated commodities (BTW Hayek's invention). Its a complete futures economy, so that interest is resolved in as many own rates of interest as there are markets. Interest is the spot price of a commoditiy over its futures price, for all commodities. Note, a positive interest means that the futures price is below that spot price which reflects the increase of the quantity of the commodity over time. And like general prices in general, interest rates coordinate independent individuals and bring their intertemporal plans into harmony. Only in a steady-state, with relative prices being constant over time, own rates are equal and is it legitimate to speak of the rate of interest. Note that AD economies are decentralized and disaggregated and thus the neoRicardian critique of early neoclassical interest theory does not apply.

In reality, of course, we have frictions and thus positive transaction costs. Money is a mean to reduce some of them. And also the loanable funds market is the system's response to such frictions. The capital market as we know it takes over most of the intertemporal exchanges in the economy. Own rates of interest are real for the few commodities traded on futures markets. The burden of intertemporal trade now rests on the money rates of interest, adjusted for risk and inflation expectations (and inflation volatility). But even though the market trades only present money for future money, money remains just a veil and real data still guides the system (also, as explained above, monetary phenomena have a short-run impact on interest rates). The major anti-Keynesian message of modern theory is that the use of money does not change to logic of the system or the nature of the economic problem. Money is rather an efficient tool to bring coordination about in a world with positive transaction costs. Since the system's optimal use of money implies nominal rigidities, changes in monetary demand for goods and services have real effects, of course.

In the real world economy, as epitomized in the AD economy, flows rules the roost. Real endowments are distributed among firms and households. Each productive asset contributes to (alternative) income flows. The job of the price system, including interest rates, is to guide the optimal choice among such investment opportunities. Thus it is the composition and level of endowments and the use of technological knowledge that generate income flows. Each asset with firms is valued according to the most valuable income stream generated by its use, discounted with the relvant money rate of interest which relates the productive opportunity set of each producer to all other investment opportunities in the economy. Fisher describes the market for loanable funds as a highway. Changes in money rates of interest induced disinvestment of some producers, releaving funds transmitted through the financial markets to others who are induced to invest since they face a higher rate of return over costs. The value of firms reflects the value added by the inherent properties of the firm (e.g. mangement) in the course of resource combination. Household transfers of assets, thus portfolio choices, change the relative price of such shares, bonds, etc.and thereby induces some firms to take up more money, and others to cut back investments. This is the invisible hand operating. But obviously, its all about flows!  


 

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Again the invisible hand: I just can't get enough (amv)

„The man of system […] seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of ist own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it. If those principles coincide and act in the same direction,the game of human society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be hapyy and successful. If they are opposite, or different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times in highest degree of disorder.“

(Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759, VI.2)
 
„As every individual, therefore, endeavours as much as je can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends only his security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those affected to trade for the public good.“

(Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776, IV:2)
 
„In civilized society [man] stands at all times in need of cooperation and assistance of great multitiudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown to maturity, is entirely independent, and ist natural state has occasion for the assistnace of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in his favour, and to show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. ‚Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want‘, is the meaning of every such offer.; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another the far greatest part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own neccessities but of their advantages.“

(A. Smith, WoN, I.2)
 
„This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another.“

(A. Smith, WoN, I.2)

„[…] nations stumble over upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action but not the result of human design. […] The forms of society are derived from an obscure and distant origin; they arise, long before the date of philosophy, from the instincts, not from the speculations of man […]. We ascribe to a previous design, what came to be known by experience, what no human wisdom could foresee, and what, without the concurring humour and disposition of his age, no authority could enable an individual to execute.“

(A. Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society, 1767)
 
„The main point is neither to extinguish nor to enfeeble self-love, but to give it such direction that it may promote the public interest by promoting ist own […]. The proper design of this chapter is to show that the universal mover in human nature, self-love, may receive such a direction in this case (as in all others) as to promote the public interest by those effects it shall make towards pursuing ist own.“

(J. Tucker, Elements of Commerce, 1756)
 
„Adam Smith‘s ‚invisible hand‘ is a poetic expression of the most fundamental of economic balance relations, the equilization of rates of return, as enforced by the tendency of factors to move from low to high returns.[...] Smith also perceived the most important implication of general equilibrium theory, the ability of a competitive system to achieve an allocation of resources that is efficient in some sense. Nothing resembling a rigorous argument for, or even a careful statement of the efficiency proposition can be found in Smith, however. [...] Thus, it can be maintained that Smith was a creator of general equilibrium theory, though the coherence and consistency of of his work may be questioned. A fortiori, later systematic expositors of the classical system, such as Ricardo, Mill, and Marx, whose work filled some of Smith‘s logical gaps, can all be regarded as early expositors of general equilibrium theory. [...] There is, however, a very important sense in which none of the classical economists had a true general equilibrium theory: None gave an explicit role to demand relations."

(Arrow, Hahn 1971: 1-2)

Saturday, April 17, 2010

The visualization of the invisible hand: complex adaptive systems (amv)

Peter Freyer provides a short description of what 'Complex Adaptive Systems' are (you can also find it here). This is what I think 'the market economy' is. And I believe this comes close to the vision of Adam Smith and F.A. Hayek.

Cause and Effect


For many years scientists saw the universe as a linear place. One where simple rules of cause and effect apply. They viewed the universe as big machine and thought that if they took the machine apart and understood the parts, then they would understand the whole [Modern macro is still there, amv]. They also thought that the universe's components could be viewed as machines, believing that if we worked on the parts of these machines and made each part work better, then the whole would work better. Scientists believed the universe and everything in it could be predicted and controlled.

However hard they tried to find the missing components to complete the picture they failed. Despite using the most powerful computers in the world the weather remained unpredictable, despite intensive study and analysis ecosystems and immune systems did not behave as expected. But it was in the world of quantum physics that the strangest discoveries were being made and it was apparent that the very smallest sub nuclear particles were behaving according to a very different set of rules to cause and effect.

Complexity Theory

Gradually as scientists of all disciplines explored these phenomena a new theory emerged - complexity theory, A theory based on relationships, emergence, patterns and iterations. A theory that maintains that the universe is full of systems, weather systems, immune systems, social systems etc and that these systems are complex and constantly adapting to their environment. Hence complex adaptive systems.

Complex Adaptive Systems
 
The agents in the system are all the components of that system. For example the air and water molecules in a weather system, and flora and fauna in an ecosystem. These agents interact and connect with each other in unpredictable and unplanned ways. But from this mass of interactions regularities emerge and start to form a pattern which feeds back on the system and informs the interactions of the agents. For example in an ecosystem if a virus starts to deplete one species this results in a greater or lesser food supply for others in the system which affects their behaviour and their numbers. A period of flux occurs in all the populations in the system until a new balance is established.


For clarity, in the diagram above the regularities, pattern and feedback are shown outside the system but in reality they are all intrinsic parts of the system.

Properties

Complex adaptive systems have many properties and the most important are,

· Emergence: Rather than being planned or controlled the agents in the system interact in apparently random ways. From all these interactions patterns emerge which informs the behaviour of the agents within the system and the behaviour of the system itself. For example a termite hill is a wondrous piece of architecture with a maze of interconnecting passages, large caverns, ventilation tunnels and much more. Yet there is no grand plan, the hill just emerges as a result of the termites following a few simple local rules.

· Co-evolution: All systems exist within their own environment and they are also part of that environment. Therefore, as their environment changes they need to change to ensure best fit. But because they are part of their environment, when they change, they change their environment, and as it has changed they need to change again, and so it goes on as a constant process. ( Perhaps it should have been Darwin's "Theory of Co-evolution". ) Some people draw a distinction between complex adaptive systems and complex evolving systems. Where the former continuously adapt to the changes around them but do not learn from the process. And where the latter learn and evolve from each change enabling them to influence their environment, better predict likely changes in the future, and prepare for them accordingly.

· Sub optimal: A complex adaptive systems does not have to be perfect in order for it to thrive within its environment. It only has to be slightly better than its competitors and any energy used on being better than that is wasted energy. A complex adaptive systems once it has reached the state of being good enough will trade off increased efficiency every time in favour of greater effectiveness.

· Requisite Variety: The greater the variety within the system the stronger it is. In fact ambiguity and paradox abound in complex adaptive systems which use contradictions to create new possibilities to co-evolve with their environment. Democracy is a good example in that its strength is derived from its tolerance and even insistence in a variety of political perspectives.

· Connectivity: The ways in which the agents in a system connect and relate to one another is critical to the survival of the system, because it is from these connections that the patterns are formed and the feedback disseminated. The relationships between the agents are generally more important than the agents themselves.

· Simple Rules: Complex adaptive systems are not complicated. The emerging patterns may have a rich variety, but like a kaleidoscope the rules governing the function of the system are quite simple. A classic example is that all the water systems in the world, all the streams, rivers, lakes, oceans, waterfalls etc with their infinite beauty, power and variety are governed by the simple principle that water finds its own level.

· Iteration: Small changes in the initial conditions of the system can have significant effects after they have passed through the emergence - feedback loop a few times (often referred to as the butterfly effect). A rolling snowball for example gains on each roll much more snow than it did on the previous roll and very soon a fist sized snowball becomes a giant one.

· Self Organising: There is no hierarchy of command and control in a complex adaptive system. There is no planning or managing, but there is a constant re-organising to find the best fit with the environment. A classic example is that if one were to take any western town and add up all the food in the shops and divide by the number of people in the town there will be near enough two weeks supply of food, but there is no food plan, food manager or any other formal controlling process. The system is continually self organising through the process of emergence and feedback.

· Edge of Chaos: Complexity theory is not the same as chaos theory, which is derived from mathematics. But chaos does have a place in complexity theory in that systems exist on a spectrum ranging from equilibrium to chaos. A system in equilibrium does not have the internal dynamics to enable it to respond to its environment and will slowly (or quickly) die. A system in chaos ceases to function as a system. The most productive state to be in is at the edge of chaos where there is maximum variety and creativity, leading to new possibilities.

· Nested Systems: Most systems are nested within other systems and many systems are systems of smaller systems. If we take the example in self organising above and consider a food shop. The shop is itself a system with its staff, customers, suppliers, and neighbours. It also belongs the food system of that town and the larger food system of that country. It belongs to the retail system locally and nationally and the economy system locally and nationally, and probably many more. Therefore it is part of many different systems most of which are themselves part of other systems.

Complex adaptive systems are all around us. Most things we take for granted are complex adaptive systems, and the agents in every system exist and behave in total ignorance of the concept but that does not impede their contribution to the system. Complex Adaptive Systems are a model for thinking about the world around us not a model for predicting what will happen. I have found that in nearly all situations I can view what is happening in Complex Adaptive Systems terms and that this opens up a variety of new options which give me more choice and more freedom.

Tuesday, April 6, 2010

The problem to be solved by the invisible hand (amv)

The complexity of an economy stands in sharp contrast to the simplicity of a question that must be raised about its operation. Many agents compose the economy, and they have to deal with a large number of commodities. Each one of those agents makes decisions about the quantity of each one of those commodities that he will produce or consume: the number of variables involved is the product of the number of agents and the number of commodities. Moreover, is this decision‐making process the agents act independently of each other, and they are guided by self‐interest. Why is high disorder not the result?
The agents of an economy are counted in millions, if not billions. The number of commodities is similarly large. The self‐interests of the independent decision‐makers are sometimes in agreement, sometimes in conflict. Why does one not observe for every commodity a large excess of demand, evidenced for instance, by lengthy waiting times for orders to be filled, or a large excess of supply over demand, evidenced, for instance, by massive inventories?

Agents no longer make independent decisions, and they interact with each other, if there are markets for commodities. Their interaction then reduces the difference between demand and supply.

—Gerard Debreu, ”Existence” 1998

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Did you know ... ? (amv)

On average, we have more and more efficient units of exhaustible resources to supply our needs due to technological progress outpacing sheer digging. In other words: exhaustible resources are on average less scarce now then sixty years ago:

Sunday, December 27, 2009

Markets as blessing (amv)

Many opinion-makers seem to agree that the financial crisis results from market failure(s) and that policies pursued during the "neo-liberal" era (1980-2005) proved to be flawed. Here some facts pointed to by Andrei Shleifer:
  1. During 1980-2005 per capita income worldwide grew by 57%! That is a 2% average growth rate.
  2. Infant mortality, a characteristic of poor countries, fell by 42% over the same period!
  3. Wordwide share of people living with 1$/day or less fell from 35% in 1980 to 19% in 2005!
  4. The median global inflation rate fell from 14,3% in 1980 to 4,1% in 2005!

So if you prefer wealth to poverty and life to death you should embrace the liberal agenda. Further, the magnitude of our current crisis is due to policy mistakes. If central banks would insure against base drifts in aggregate demand by some kind of NGDP-level-path targeting, instead of inflation targeting, most asset devaluations could have been avoided. There would be no need for bail-outs, for further regulations, etc. Systemic crises are by necessity demand driven, and demand is controlled by credible monetary policy ....

Sunday, November 15, 2009

Plato on ... (amv)

... constant intertemporal preferences in Arrow-Debreu or rational expectations economies:

"A man is said to be the same person from childhood until he is advanced in years: yet though he is called the same he does not at any time possess the same properties; he is continually becoming a new person . . . not only in his body but in his soul besides we find none of his manners or habits, his opinions, desires, pleasures, pains or fears, ever abiding the same in his particular self, some things grow in him while others perish." (Symposium, 207D–208B)

Sunday, October 4, 2009

Asymmetric information and the REE (amv)

Hohenheim hosted a workshop on the history of macroeconomics. All guests were excellent and the papers presented nicely combined the past of our science with our current research frontiers. It's just great to be an economist and to grow into the profession: there are plenty of nice and interesting people, all much smarter than myself, so that there is a lot of learning experience whenever they cluster. From my personal research background, I was expecially happy to see Pascal Bridel in Hohenheim, a true expert in general equilibrium analysis (inter alia) and a really, really subtle and challenging guy.

However, another of our outstandingly warm and competent guests proved to be the more challenging to me. After my little talk on Wicksell, Hayek, and Robbins and their respective contributions to optimal and endogenous growth Muriel Dal-Pont and I discussed the relation between asymmetric information and Rational Expectation Equilibrium (EER).

Muriel's point - if I get it right - is that following Stiglitz/Grossman there is no need to associate the REE with Arrow-Debreu equilibria. My first reaction was to think of the kind of contrained Pareto optimality highlighted by Stigler/Becker and other Chicagoans. But as Muriel correctly argued, Stiglitz/Grossman goes beyond such transaction cost reasoning. In a Stiglitz/Grossman world, asymmetric information leads to strategic behaviour, that is, people trying to game the system (I may add: this goes hand in hand with the assumption of imperfect competition. If competition is perfect, that is, if every agent of the system faces a perfect outside option, strategic behaviour vanshies despite asymmetric information. Further, in large economies strategic behaviour earns little if any payoff, since all coalitions are dominated by some other coalitions. The weakly dominant strategy is to play price-taker, even if you are not ... common knowledge is however important). If rational people game the system, so Muriel, REE can describe allocations not related to the constrained Pareto efficiency developed by Stigler and Becker.

My argument against Muriel is this: she is completely right in so far as we can develop partial equilibrium models which combine rational expectations with Stiglitz/Grossman-like market failures. But as I understand their research right, they themselves argue that on a general level a rational expectations equilibrium does not exist, given their assumptions on asymmetric information. Strategic behaviour simply cannot be handled by pure Arrow-Debreu schemes. I would further argue that the existence of REE in the case of asymmetric information may still be proven if we could make more use of Hurwicz's mechanism design and check for institutional settings that ensure incentive compatibility and minimize the payoff to strategic behaviour. So, since I argued strictly on a general equilibrium level, I keep my position that if REE exist, it must be the Arrow-Debreu-Stigler-Becker style of constrained optimum that it describes. In a global model, in constrast to partial analysis, either you assume asymmetric information and skip the general equilibrium notion, or you have to skip asymmetric information so as to keep REE.

See also my comments here.